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rucksack and sustained me throughout my tour as
she endured her own private, tortuous, and lonely
hell for a year. To Cannon, Holden, McKenna, and
Duncan, I hope someday your children will inherit
a world far better and safer than the one I have
tried to give to you.
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PREFACE

I couldn’t sleep early one spring morning in 2003. I was an Army Reserve
officer sitting on the sidelines of my professional part-time military life,
restlessly waiting to be called into the game: the war in Afghanistan and the
pickup game the United States had started in Iraq. In the aftermath of 9/11, I
knew going off to war was a question of when, not if. Even before 9/11 at the
Defense Information School (dinfos ) at Fort Meade, Maryland, we were
told by our instructors that if we were in the Army Reserve and serving as
public affairs officers, we would likely deploy to operations in Kosovo or Haiti
or to the Middle East in support of un sanctions against Iraq. More than 85
percent of the Army’s public affairs assets at that time were in the reserve.
I was a public affairs officer, known as a pao in the ranks. pao s are public
relations (pr ) guys in uniform. They are charged, in a nutshell, with selling war,
although most of them would offer more glamorous job descriptions if asked.
From the looks of things months after Iraq’s “liberation,” there’d be a lot to sell.
I sat in my home office grading papers from a college journalism course
I was teaching as an adjunct faculty member. By the glow of the television
I worked, occasionally looking up to watch the Fox News report that was
on the air. Fox News war coverage was on at all hours of the day, so it was
by default that it was on my television. Then I saw a familiar face on the
television screen. It was Fox News reporter Greg Kelly, my classmate from
the Defense Information School. We had attended pao training together
a few years earlier after Greg traded in his fighter-jet yoke for a handheld
microphone. He decided to pursue a career in broadcast journalism, so he
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left the active-duty Marine Corps to become a Marine Corps Reserve pao .
The guy I knew as a Harrier jet aviator who wouldn’t wear his uniform hat
because it messed up his hair (something he readily admitted) was riding
shotgun with U.S. troops as they crossed the border and fought their way
into Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein.
There seemed to be on every channel an embedded journalist like Greg
reporting from the front lines. Prior U.S. wars had seen problems between
the press and the military, two professions rooted and protected in the U.S.
Constitution. I hoped this war would be different, and days into it there
were little signs of trouble. Politics aside and professionally speaking, the
press had not challenged the call to invade Iraq, and they were along for
the ride, literally and figuratively. That nonchallenging posture always
made the jobs of pao s much easier. The press was all over the battlefield,
embedded with U.S. military units. Defense Department officials estimate
that more than seven hundred reporters were embedded in the early days
of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Before long Hussein’s statue was toppled in a dusty Baghdad square,
and Iraqis danced in the streets. Coalition troops were heroes, and international press reports buzzed about the success of the liberation. The world
was punch drunk that Hussein was on the run and Iraq was free. But by
late 2003, a few months after U.S. president George W. Bush prematurely
announced an end to major combat operations in Iraq on the deck of the

uss Abraham Lincoln, attacks on coalition forces increased.
I watched from afar as the dynamics of the war began to change. Violence began to take a daily toll in Iraq on U.S. forces, and then as suddenly
as a dust storm forms, the paradigm shifted and more Iraqi civilians were
becoming casualties. An insurgency had formed, and anyone with a beef
against the United States could come to Iraq and kill Americans. Ideologically motivated terrorists or anyone looking to earn a living as a mercenary
found plenty of opportunity in Iraq if killing was their trade. Even Iraqis
with no beef against the Americans could make a killing, no pun intended,
by planting bombs, firing a mortar or rocket, or shooting at U.S. soldiers.
We had unknowingly created a marketplace for mischief.
x
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There was also a shift by U.S. communicators from tactical information
management to a broader, more strategic operation. The journalists’ embeds,
a tactical information effort, had yielded remarkable strategic results, but
in 2004, with little meaningful public relations products coming from the
ranks, senior civilian leaders and U.S. military communicators centralized
informational control in Baghdad.
Information would now be propagated from behind the blast walls of
the Green Zone. For example, the capture of enemy forces might take place
in the northern city of Mosul, but it was Coalition Provisional Authority
(cpa ) spokespersons in the Green Zone who would brief the press about the
operation. Reporters were told about what happened; they were not shown
what was happening. This was in sharp contrast to the embed operation
that had reporters covering the war at the operational level where boots
meet the ground. As the cpa pushed to control the U.S. military’s public
relations operation, gloomy news reports from around Iraq began to bubble
up in nonmainstream media forums sharply contrasting the cpa ’s press
conferences in the Green Zone, which were chest-beating, feel-good events
designed to evoke feelings of U.S. accomplishment and progress in Iraq.
Many Iraqis complained that security in Iraq had worsened since the U.S.
invasion, and some studies indicated that at least one hundred thousand
Iraqis had died between 2003 and 2004 as a result of the invasion.
Stateside, I wondered why the cpa wasn’t informing Iraqis of the progress being made in Iraq. Something didn’t seem right. The cpa was telling
the world about all this great progress, yet there were images of squalor,
violence, and dismay in just about every news publication and on every
channel. In addition, why was the cpa hell-bent on selling progress in Iraq
to Americans? It seemed like the cpa was briefing the wrong audience. I
was starting to get a whiff of U.S. propaganda, but it never occurred to me
the cpa was increasing their rhetoric about U.S. progress in Iraq to drown
out the cries and concerns of Iraqis—nobody would do that, I thought. We
have our flaws, but as Americans we’d never do that. I’d learn I was wrong.
Because information operations were centralized in Baghdad, the cpa
had the floor and the microphone; they were in control. As U.S. forces
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ushered in 2004 in Iraq, the military slice-of-life news stories that had
prevailed in mass media since 2003 were disappearing because of the cpa ’s
tightly held rein on the communications operation. Small U.S. successes
showcased by embedded press, and critical in maintaining public opinion,
were all but extinct because the cpa had corralled reporters. If reporters
wanted information about operations in Iraq, there was only one place to
get it, in the Green Zone’s convention center, where slick corporate-style
contracted marketers, military pao s, and administration cronies tried to
convince the world that Iraq was in good hands.
Some Western reporters, having learned the lessons of a tightly regulated
press corps in Operation Desert Storm, attended cpa press briefings but
sent Arab stringers into the streets to verify the veracity of reports coming
from the pao or spokesperson at the podium. Most cpa claims were easily
disproved. News reports began to reveal huge discrepancies between cpa
assertions and Iraqi realities. The Arab media, distrustful of U.S. military

pao s and unimpressed with American reporters, whom they felt didn’t
show the Arab perspective in their stories, a belief dating back to Desert
Storm, led the assault against the U.S. military’s claims of utopia in Iraq.
From the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom the Arab media gunned for
an unvarnished angle that focused mostly on Iraqi civilian deaths and on
Arab suffering at the hands of U.S. forces. Arab suffering, an underreported
issue in Western media, was the central theme. As the Arab press roused the
Pan-Arab world with stories of Arab anguish, the cpa obsessively talked
to the American press. pao s were concerned more with improving U.S.
public opinion about the war in Iraq and protecting the administration’s
reputation. pao s and U.S. communicators were not concerned with using
information to help save American and Iraqi lives by improving conditions
on the ground in Iraq. While the coalition didn’t ignore the Arab media
completely, the bulk of the effort was directed at the Western press. The
leftover scraps, I’d learn, would go to the Arab press.
Information could have served as a tourniquet in Iraq. With information
an informed Iraqi people could have slowed, if not stopped, the societal and
cultural violence in their world. There is a direct link between information
xii
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operations and influencing public opinion. The U.S. Defense Department
knows that information operations on the battlefield are critical to operational success in a fight against insurgents just as much as diplomacy is
needed with military power. The Defense Department knows this and
spent hundreds of millions of dollars trying to find the right public relations
formula for Iraq, with very little success. While informing Iraqis certainly
wouldn’t have prevented an all-out insurgency, strong evidence suggests
the lack of a sustainable contingency communications plan hastened the
insurgency’s ability to take root. U.S. military leaders have stated that successful information operations are critical to a counterinsurgency, but my
time in Iraq showed me that few, if any, in the U.S. military and in the U.S.
government understand how to successfully conduct information operations using factual, accurate information in public relations operations.
Journalist and media critic Walter Lippmann hypothesized that the bulk
of a society is usually governed by an elite few who are educated bureaucrats
with a bigger picture in their minds of what is best for the populace. Those
who are governed are referred to as the “herd” and in essence are told what
to think by the elitist class, who overlook local issues and strive for the better good of the collective mass. Lippmann believed that if 80 percent of the
populace or the herd was not told what to do or how to think by the elites,
the herd would develop its own opinions and chaos would rule.
Although a model like Lippmann’s can be construed as outrageous and
elitist, it is sobering, and his position is very much what American society
has become in the millennium with its two-party system and politicos who
are paid to vote their conscience and take liberties with their powers in the
name of the people they represent. Americans are told what to think given
limited choices on issues. Americans are mostly pro-this or anti-that, Left
or Right. There are few options for Americans to truly develop and practice
individualistic, independent, and moderate ideals. Marketers, public relations
professionals, politicians, lobbyists, and communicators control American
cultural habits. They tell us what to buy, how to think, and how to live, and
they do it by spending more than $100 billion per year on advertising and
public relations to sway and hold public opinion on everything from waffles
Preface
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to candidates for governors. Communications is critical for those who want
power or to those who want to retain it.
In preinvasion Iraq Hussein controlled information, and Iraqis followed along because they had little outside information, but many more
followed Hussein because they knew challenging the dictator meant dire
consequences. Iraq controlled its herd by force. In the United States many
Americans were manipulated to support the invasion of Iraq when they
heard arguments for preemption based on a faulty connection to weapons
of mass destruction or to the 9/11 attacks. As the war in Iraq progressed
during its first year, the herd back in the United States was fed a steady
banquet of information by cpa spokesman Dan Senor and Brig. Gen.
Mark Kimmitt of the U.S. Army through the usual troughs of information,

cpa press briefings. But Iraqi masses were famished and suffered from an
information drought. To worsen the situation, they were infected with a
viral strain of chaos caused by the insurgency. Lippmann’s bewildered-herd
theory had manifested itself in Iraq. Chaos, not democracy, had come to
Iraq once the postinvasion dust had settled.
Communications is the cornerstone of all human actions; without it,
we do not understand each other’s intentions, motivations, and actions.
Generally speaking, educated people cannot derive conclusions without
first processing information, digesting it, and then formulating ideologies
based on their personal bias, genetic makeup, education, and socioeconomic standing. Humans are hardwired to lean toward certain concepts
and opinions, a genetic predisposition, but well-presented information can
help people process events as the brain sends it into mental processing, sort
of like adding salt or pepper to an entrée.
Communicators in academe no longer argue about objectivity in journalism. Lippmann believed that reporters processed events subjectively and
that fairness and accuracy in the story were by-products of the personal
beliefs of a reporter. He was a man ahead of his time, as increasingly in this
political environment audiences are seeing press institutions taking sides,
Left or Right, or, in the case of international media, the side of nationalism,
meaning the media cover stories with news angles that connect to their
xiv
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audiences. This is nothing new but only now coming to light due mostly to
the advent of communications technology and emerging media platforms.
Overseas, foreign media news angles often conflict with U.S. political and
military agendas, and the conflict intensifies when news is compounded with
graphic images or gory reports. “If it bleeds, it leads” is an old adage associated with the press. The more lurid the content, the more fascinating it is to
consumers. There are many sociological and psychological reasons for this
human obsession with death, and I’m certain part of it has to do with the
fact that as mortals, it is captivating to be reminded of one’s own mortality,
but news also has entertaining human elements, including conflict, hope,
and resolution, but across the board humans internationally cannot help but
watch violence because the tragic fact is that another human somewhere is no
more because of it. Conflict is why we buy books, watch movies, and listen to
music. Without it, what is there? As inhabitants of this planet, our predecessors
fought elements, enemies, disease, and nature to survive. Conflict is hardwired
into us all, and as much as we may not like that, it’s part of human nature.
The human drama can make public relations work harder or easier. In Iraq
U.S. pao s often joked about how hard it was to get positive stories in the press.
They complained about trying to “sell” a war wrought with poor high-level
administrative decisions. I joke about it, but the rudimentary mistake is that

pao s shouldn’t fancy themselves salesmen marketing a product or concept,
but rather they should be conveyors of facts that are carefully determined during operational planning. pao s should be vehicles for truths that are created
as objectives of broader civil and military operations. How pao s approach
their duties impacts the media’s coverage of events. I too have joked about
selling war, but the hard truth is that if pao s fail to communicate effectively
to a host-nation populace, people die and that is no laughing matter.
The insurgents with a small force of only about five thousand, according
to U.S. military reports I read in 2004 shortly after I arrived in Baghdad,
turned a nation of twenty-six million upside down. They used information
on websites, notes left on front doors, flyers tacked onto street posts, pamphlets and newsletters, and broadcasts on Arab news channels to convey
their objectives and beliefs. They followed up their statements with action.
Preface
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They warned Iraqis not to help the coalition because the coalition’s mission
was unjust and unholy. Those who helped the coalition would be killed,
and they backed this up by showing beheadings of coalition colluders. They
warned towns not to allow coalition soldiers or Iraqi forces into their city’s
limits because doing so meant acceptance of coalition policies and would be
viewed as cooperation. They supported their assertions by bombing a marketplace when instructions weren’t followed. The insurgents communicated
their beliefs and ideals and then showed they meant business by acting on
their promises. They forcefully swayed Iraqi public opinion by denouncing
the American system of Iraqi democracy, and they garnered Iraqi support
through violence and fear, just as Hussein had done for decades.
The insurgency had gained a foothold in Iraq and forced support from
Iraqis through aggressive intimidation and sometimes distortion of information, tactics that had worked well for Hussein. Iraqis increasingly began
to allow insurgents to operate in their locales, fearing retaliation if they
reported them because the coalition had disbanded Iraq’s security forces
and there was no internal defense or police force. But Iraqis also blindly
followed the insurgents because there was no U.S. or Iraqi information
provided to the Iraqi masses to counter what they were being told by the
terrorists. The insurgents had their havens and a captive audience.
“Social reform is never popular in the victim country,” social scientist
Noam Chomsky wrote in What Uncle Sam Really Wants (1992). “You can’t
get many of the people living there excited about it, except a small group
connected with U.S. businesses who are going to profit from it.” Chomsky’s
words couldn’t have been more apropos in Iraq. It was hard for Iraqis to get
excited about their newfound democracy when violence and crime were
rampant and living conditions had worsened throughout the nation since
the U.S. arrival. The democratic experiment was failing not because of flawed
ideals but because of flawed U.S. management. The only sources offering
seemingly valid explanations to the Iraqi masses were the insurgents, and
the Iraqis listened, maybe not believing what they were hearing, but they
listened. The American government was too busy talking to the American
media, and the Iraqi government was not talking to anyone.
xvi
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I eventually got my number called as a reservist, and I was in the proverbial game. My assignment in Iraq was to support the U.S. exit strategy
in Iraq by telling the world about the development of Iraqi security forces.
Our unit was a multinational command composed of military advisers from
the army, navy, air force, and marine corps from militaries all over the globe
as well as civilian contractors and government officials from around the
world. We were responsible for training, equipping, and mentoring Iraqi
security forces. As the tip of the spear for U.S. foreign policy in Iraq, we had
billions of dollars in our budget and priceless human capital.
Our mission was unique in that we weren’t solely responsible for security and stability operations in Iraq like the bulk of the forces there. Our
job was to prepare nascent Iraqi troops to someday provide security for
their nation and defend it against attacks, including conducting intense
counterinsurgency operations.
Days after arriving in Iraq in 2004, what I discovered was disheartening
and discouraging, and it explained why the media’s reportage had become
what pao s alleged to be “lopsided.” Coalition pao s weren’t productive.

cpa pao s behaved as if they were at a frat party, and some were young,
inexperienced civilians who treated reporters with contempt. They relied
on a complex labyrinth of public affairs organizational charts to delay and
confuse reporters on deadline. The military ranks weren’t much better. People
in key public affairs roles within the Green Zone weren’t the very best the
military had to offer, especially since President Bush had made Iraq such a
highly visible priority in the U.S. War on Terror. Many military public affairs
personnel had only one public affairs deployment under their belt, if any, and
most didn’t have wartime communications experience. Nobody knew how
to conduct a communications campaign during an insurgency, including
me. Fresh from the Cold War, pao s were short on this kind of skill, and it
seemed as if nobody had been paying attention to what had happened to the
Soviets in Afghanistan or even to our own military in Vietnam. The Iraqi
battlefield called for creativity, but what I found was a military entrenched
in its conventional communications tactics, unwilling to leave its foxholes
and try new strategies and take terrain from the bad guys.
Preface
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For Green Zone pao s evenings in Baghdad were a back-smacking good
time. It seemed like there was a steady stream of incoming and outgoing

pao s, ticket punchers ensuring they got their war credentials so they could
lock up careers and promotions. Those leaving the war zone were unjustifiably congratulated for “great work,” and many pao s who were now in the
eye of the storm ratcheted up the antimedia rhetoric, firmly in control of
information, as they ran the communications operation into the ground.
Accountability, plans, strategy, and urgency were absent. There was no
proactive connection between the operational forces on the ground and the
communicators. There was only the usual reactive posture known to pao s.
Poolside at Hussein’s Republican Palace was the place to be seen for the

cpa crowd. Meanwhile, infantrymen and combat support personnel turned
riflemen were subjected to less than austere living conditions at forward
operating bases throughout the country and performed nightmarish missions
outside the wire that guaranteed someone in their unit would get hurt or
killed. Those in the Green Zone lived a plush life, and the threat of mortar
rounds and rockets kept life edgy under a romantic canopy of false bravado.
This is not to say that all public affairs personnel in Iraq were bad. There
were a great many who did good work and tried to turn the tide. A few were
bright thinkers. There were some who worked their tails off Stateside to
support pao s in Iraq too, and for the most part the majority of the enlisted
personnel in the public affairs force braved the bullets, bombs, and chaos
to capture the story of U.S. forces in Iraq. They did incredible work as they
brought the war fighter’s point of view to the rest of the world. But overwhelmingly, the collective public affairs force involved in the early stages
of Operation Iraqi Freedom was an exceptional failure, and the efforts of
a stellar few were overshadowed by the actions of a clueless many. While
some pao s can argue that they were just following orders, that tone is set at
the top, and to the notion that things have always been done a certain way,
I say, “Bullshit!” Anyone in uniform who is a commissioned or noncommissioned officer has a responsibility to be accountable and to speak up
when things are running aground. I believe most pao s said nothing about
how screwed up the communications campaign was in Iraq because they
xviii
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believed they were doing nothing wrong; they were unwilling to analyze
situations and examine problems thoroughly because they believed they
were on a good path. Many thought they were doing things correctly, and
when things went south the press was blamed. Rather than have deep
professional introspection, or a careful examination of the stated mission
and the environment, pao s deflected the reality. I don’t think many pao s
knew just how bad they were doing in Iraq. I use their actions as barometers. Emotionally, most pao s running the communications war weren’t
connected to the real war in Iraq. It was evident by the hours they kept,
the circles they ran in, and the amount of time they spent in safety. They
were too close to the process and to the flagpole, and they couldn’t critically review their operations because doing so meant taking a hard look at
themselves and what they were failing to do.
I deployed to Iraq not as a war fighter in the traditional sense, but instead
with a loosely assembled communications plan in my head and plenty of
strategic concepts in hopes that my so-called combat reach would be broader
than just the range on my rifle. My contribution to protect U.S. forces, my
impact on the war, I believed, would come from my ability to sway and hold
Iraqi public opinion through a graceful and transparent engagement of the
Arab press. The insurgency was rooted in Iraq because of U.S. forces’ and
the Iraqi Governing Council’s inability to talk to the Arab world. Iraqis had
been ignored for more than a year, as the insurgency took away Iraqi public
support from the Americans. The U.S. and Iraqi governments never deemed
it important to communicate with the Iraqi masses, and I believed I needed
to get Iraqi officials talking to the Iraqi masses to help calm Lippmann’s
bewildered herd in Iraq.
Iraqis wondered what their government was doing behind the high
walls of the Green Zone, and as many pao s sat comfortably in their airconditioned offices enjoying the benefits of a headquarters assignment,
coalition soldiers on the mean streets of Iraq paid the price for a reactive,
poorly planned, and bungled war information plan. As a result of failing
to communicate with the Iraqi masses and the Arab world, the U.S. public
affairs community is partly responsible for the deaths and injuries of those
Preface
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casualties caused by the insurgency. The coalition should have fanned flames
of Iraqi support, but instead it fueled an explosive insurgency by inaction
and miscommunication.
I spent my entire tour in Iraq fighting my public affairs peers, their way
of thinking, their adhesion to obsolete practices, their limitless patience
for Iraqi bureaucracy, and their reactive posture. During my tour in Iraq
we tried to paint a picture of what we saw. Like any other public relations
professional, pao s work to get information out to the public, and in Iraq
that job included informing the Arab public as well as the American public,
but most pao s didn’t see it that way.
Things were tough for me and my team, but our command was making
strides and progress in training Iraqi forces and things were improving.
That story reached many Iraqis and the Arab street during my tour as
the chief pao for the Multinational Security Transition Command Iraq
(mnstci ), and it reached many back at home and abroad. The insurgents
took notice too and launched a violent campaign directly aimed at stopping
our information flow to the Iraqi people. They attacked some of the Arab
media contacts I worked with routinely and threatened my Iraqi public
affairs counterparts. They even threatened me. It was a battle they would
win in a war I am hopeful the United States won’t lose.
Misdirected effort by the collective public affairs community in Iraq and
Washington dc that includes the Coalition Provisional Authority, U.S. State
Department, Defense Department and all its services, Iraq Reconstruction
Management Office, Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance,
the multinational commands in Iraq, government contractors, and countless
other agencies in the fray cost the military services of the coalition in human
capital, the costliest of commodities; damaged the credibility of the nation
in the region; and made the United States a spectacle in the Arab world.
While I may have faced frustrations and heartache in Iraq, my experiences and disappointments are minuscule when compared to what those
under fire have survived. Their physical and emotional sacrifices can’t be
calculated. There is no scale to measure their devotion to duty or the cost
of what they bear. My hope is that come what may in the publication of
xx
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this book, the military changes the way it conducts its communications
business and that pao s come to understand that they need to be assertive on the battlefield. They can change conditions on the ground for our
military personnel and not just be a reactionary force waiting to respond
to incidents on the battlefield. If this book ultimately saves some lives, then
I’ve accomplished my objective, something I failed to do in Iraq.
It is with an extremely heavy heart that I wrote this book because the
U.S. military has been a part of my life longer than many of my personal
relationships, and in many ways it was a surrogate family for me when I was
a young man. New to the ranks in 1982, I was reared by tough Vietnam War
noncommissioned officers who showed me how to grow a thick skin, how
to lead from the front and find the strength to say things that are unpopular.
My dirty-boot time during the Cold War was spent as an enlisted military
policeman walking fence lines overseas with a military working dog, three
hundred rounds of ammunition on my belt with an assault rifle slung across
my back. I deployed to the field, lived in foxholes for days and weeks at a
time, and prepared for a Cold War showdown that never happened. When
I traded in my sergeant stripes for my second lieutenant butter bars and
became an officer, I spent a short time assigned to an infantry battalion as a
platoon leader charged with leading combat medics. I was fortunate in that
the first half of my career offered me a small glimpse of how thankless some
military professions could be, and I carried that with me as I became a pao .
This book is part memoir, part public relations handbook, part afteraction review, part white paper, part catharsis, and a firsthand account of
my yearlong mobilization to support Operation Iraqi Freedom as an Army
public affairs officer and as the first chief of public affairs for Multinational
Security Transition Command Iraq. It was written using materials from my
tour in Iraq, including thousands of conversations, interviews, e-mails, and
unclassified documents that I was exposed to during that time. It is also
peppered with supportive research.
Here is some information to process, digest, and formulate an opinion
on, a story with an ending not yet written, but written with the belief that
the pen indeed is mightier than the sword.
Preface
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1

INSULATION
May 13, 2004: Attacks in Baghdad increased to 130 this week,
up from 81 the previous week.
—Office of Security Cooperation (osc ) unclassified intelligence report

My son walked next to me and held my hand as the creamy, sweet smell
of jasmine drifted by us on a warm breeze. Occasionally, he glanced at me,
mostly after thunder rumbled in the distance, well beyond the Spanish
moss-covered oaks that canopied our neighborhood in central Florida.
“Don’t be scared,” I told him. “It’s just thunder.” But nonetheless we quickened our pace, his hand firmly clasped in mine, as the thunder roared again,
closer this time, louder than before, shaking the ground beneath us. Then
something I couldn’t see began to pull at my leg almost like a cramp, and I
heard a voice that was definitely not the soft voice of my two-year-old boy.
“Steve, get up!”
I looked around, and it was still just me and Duncan standing underneath
the tall oaks. The tugging on my leg continued, but when I looked down,
nothing was there. Then an extraordinarily loud sound enveloped me. Boom!
A young man suddenly appeared and hovered over me. He was agitated.
For a second I didn’t know where I was or who he was, but as I rubbed my
eyes I realized I was back in the shitty reality I had volunteered to join.
My roommate, John, a young Army Reserve lieutenant, was yelling at
me. As I departed the clarity of my dream and entered the fog of war, his
voice got clearer.
“Steve! Wake the fuck up, man!” John yelled. “Dude, get up! We’re getting hit!”
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Our camp along the banks of the Tigris River in the Green Zone was getting pelted with rockets and mortar rounds, and he had been tugging on my
leg, trying to wake me. The thunder I had heard in my dream was in reality
explosions from insurgent rounds angrily closing in on our officer quarters.
I was exhausted, a uniformed zombie propped up each day by the hope
of our mission and propelled by shots of espresso and dozens upon dozens
of cups of coffee and chai tea. Once as I waited for a helicopter at a landing
zone (lz ) at Camp Liberty, desperate for a pick-me-up in the energy-sapping
three-digit heat, I emptied a pack of freeze-dried coffee into my mouth and
added a few gulps of water that had warmed in my canteen after a daylong
trip to eastern Iraq.
My team had been working an aggressive media campaign for three
weeks, sleeping about four hours per night, if we were lucky, and I was
skipping meals, thinking about taking up smoking again after eighteen
years, not calling or writing home, and putting my nervous system through
hell with a steady drip of caffeine that kept me moving. When I was at the
office I was often pinging off the walls. When we traveled my right leg
twitched nervously, continuously, as if I were quickly stepping on a bass
drum, keeping a steady beat of activity that was driving my dick into the
dirt. That night the insurgents literally could have dropped a bomb on me
and I would have slept through it.
John and I ran outside to watch the nearby British compound take a
beating. The compound was just a few yards from our hooch, and the place
had a pub and was one of a few mental-health havens within the Green
Zone. Temperate British soldiers and overpaid American civilians enjoyed
pints of ale and escaped the seemingly inescapable feeling of perpetual
Groundhog Day syndrome common to those who spent their entire war
tours under the long shadows of high concrete blast walls at the fortified
Baghdad compound. A few of us congregated amid the camp’s confusion, and we watched, stupefied, as the indirect enemy fire worked its way
closer and closer to us. In between the mortar rounds, rockets exploded
loudly around us, some closer than others. The rockets were being fired
indiscriminately, and many simply whizzed overhead and impacted deeper
2
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inside the Green Zone, but the mortars were being slowly and deliberately
directed toward our camp.
A small crowd of U.S. officers, including three West Pointers who moved
closer from the other side of the camp to get a better look at the incoming
rounds, all watched the attack like spectators. This was new to me even
though I was a career officer, and there was something captivating and
mesmerizing about people trying to kill us. Given the decades of training
I had received, I think I would have had more common sense and an overwhelming drive to flee for my life, but no shit there I was, out in the open,
watching the attack, failing to take cover, and getting sprinkled with a light
dusting of powdery sand that had been pulverized by the exploding rounds.
For many that night the attack would be the closest they’d ever get to
the enemy. For hundreds of thousands of “fobbits,” as we were affectionately dubbed by the guys operating outside compounds known as forward
operating bases, it would be the only way many remembered they were
actually in a war. We were all morbidly fascinated by the attack. We had
that luxury, unlike the soldiers who patrolled the streets of Iraq “moving
to contact,” militaryspeak for soldiers looking to brawl with the bad guys.
They used themselves to draw the enemy out of hiding.
While there was a chance of getting killed or wounded by a random
mortar round, rocket, or occasional suicide bomber in the Green Zone, most
informed, professional, and pragmatic soldiers knew that the real threat was
beyond the reinforced walls of the compound, and improvised explosive
devices, known as “ied s,” were the leading killer of U.S. soldiers in Iraq.
There was a threat inside the Green Zone, and during my time in Baghdad several people died from lucky-shot mortar rounds, rockets, and even
suicide bombers inside its walls, but given the fact that it had been raining
mortars on us nearly every day for a month and only a couple of people
had been killed, the real threat was outside the Green Zone’s walls. Statistics
showed the danger was elsewhere, and I suppose those figures gave us a
false sense of security that night, but I think for most of us it was fascinating to be on the working end of a weapons platform. That changed when
a round landed several yards from us.
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“Get the fuck down!” John yelled as a round came screaming at us. We
all hugged the ground as the round exploded, and a dusty cloud tinged
with a burned gunpowder-like odor enveloped us. Another round came
screaming in, and we finally did what we should have done minutes earlier:
we ran for cover. An enemy spotter, it seemed, had our position locked.
I don’t remember breathing, and my feet were heavy as if they were
buried in wet sand. I couldn’t move fast enough, although I knew mentally
all pistons were firing and telling my body to run faster. As I ran away from
the corner of the camp’s perimeter, the rounds seemed to follow us. I was
lost as I made my way, weaving in and out of the warren of trailers, trying to
find someplace to put some concrete between me and the sky. The incoming
shrieking rounds propelled me. I felt if I could outrun the sound, I would
be okay. I looked around as I sprinted to find no one near me; everyone
had gone different directions. I have never felt so alone. It felt like I had
gone the wrong way, as if there was a right way to run. As I moved I got
my bearings, and I made a beeline to the only known hard edifice in the
compound, a blown-out building one hundred meters from our trailer. It
seemed as if it was twenty miles away. In the distance the rounds menacingly kept announcing their departure with a sound familiar to magic acts.
Foom! Then almost magically, the rounds would explode in our camp. Off
in the distance the cpa ’s loudspeakers warned, “Take cover! Take cover!”
although the rounds had now been falling for several minutes.
It was the early summer of 2004, and there were no bunkers to protect
coalition personnel from enemy mortar rounds and rockets. We had airconditioning and running water in our quarters, but no bunkers to protect
us from indirect fire. At least we’d die cool and clean, we always joked, but
the fact that we had creature comforts instead of personnel protection
measures was an indicator of how mismanaged U.S. priorities were in
Baghdad. The camps were basically trailer parks. Each trailer, if you were
not a general officer or high-ranking civilian or if you didn’t have connections, was shared by at least four personnel. The trailers were divided in
half by a common bathroom; two people occupied each side of the trailer,
and four people used one bathroom.
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Living conditions were good, and we had electrical power and heated
potable tap water most of the time, although I do remember taking one
shower that coated me with a slimy film and made me stink of fuel. My
guess is that a contractor likely hungover from the previous night’s partying
at Saddam’s pool mistakenly filled a fuel tanker with water, or vice versa,
and dispensed the tainted water into the potable-water reservoir camp
residents used for personal hygiene. I figured the fuel-enriched water would
kill any Iraqi critters that had set up their own camps on my body, so that
day I simply stayed away from smokers. In hindsight I think I lucked out.
Somewhere, I thought, there was a convoy in Iraq with sputtering engines
caused by water in their fuel systems, something that likely pissed off a
group of soldiers who got attacked due to the slow speed of their convoy. I
happily smelled like a gas station attendant for a day.
Home life in Baghdad wasn’t tough at all. We had new furniture and
beds, including televisions with dvd players. Toward the end of my tour
we were even given satellite television connections. Things were certainly
much worse elsewhere in Iraq, and the steady nightly flow of medevac
helicopters mercifully ferrying wounded troops into the Green Zone’s
military hospital was proof of that. As they came in over the river on their
flight path, sometimes their prop wash would churn up dust and vibrate
our tin living quarters and remind me just how much worse it could be for
me. Even if we didn’t have bunkers and sandbags, I wasn’t going to bitch.
I could be sleeping and shitting in a hole somewhere, or, worse, I could be
sent home in a body bag to fill one.
Our camps were comfortable but impractical and evidence that the U.S.
government was catering to civilians who shared battle space with military
folks. Somewhere along the way someone had forgotten that we were in
a war zone. As civilian personnel flooded Iraq, camps in the Green Zone
were built to house them. But the trailers provided as living quarters and
as offices were nothing more than aluminum sheds. Having spent time in
the field in military tents, I loved the sheds. They kept heat and cool in as
needed and were comfortable, but they didn’t keep anything else out. In
fact, once as my interpreter sat at his desk working on his computer, an
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ak -47 machine-gun round came slamming through the roof and bounced
off his desk, ricocheted off of some lockers and the floor, and bounced into
his hands.
“It is Allah’s will I didn’t die today, Captain,” he said happily.
“No, you’re simply a lucky motherfucker,” I told him. I’ve since heard
that story told many times by Iraq war veterans. I guess I was successful
in telling at least one story in Iraq or there were many more lucky Iraqis
who dodged a bullet.
Months after I arrived and after months of constant indirect fire attacks,
someone, thankfully, finally found the wisdom to insulate our trailers with
sandbags in 2004. Although I was thankful for the protection, I’m certain
the sandbags could have gone somewhere else where insurgent activity
was much worse. The bags weren’t placed on the rooftops because the tin
sheds couldn’t support the weight of sandbags, but they did place them
high around the walls, which was better than nothing. Later, thick concrete
bunkers were placed around the camp so we could run into them should
we come under fire. One was thankfully placed right outside our trailer not
more than ten feet from my door, right near the spot where I was a spectator with the other dumbass officers. Attacks would become so regular that
many soldiers would grab their laptops, music players, and handheld video
games as they ran to the bunkers. They grabbed anything to help pass the
time as we waited for the “all clear” from the loudspeakers under twentyfour inches of reinforced concrete. It was like waiting for a train or for the
rain to stop. We were simply killing time while insurgents were trying to
kill us, but most of us didn’t romanticize it. Attacks were inconvenient and
annoying, but a part of life in Baghdad. While the attacks were frequent,
they were ineffective, and the odds were great that a person could spend
several years inside the sprawling Green Zone and never get hit or even
near an attack. My odds that night were simply not the norm.
The night I was dreaming of my son, we had nothing but half-demolished
concrete-block buildings to flee to and the moon’s warm glow to find our
way there in the dead of night, but at least we knew where the mortar rounds
were landing and logic dictated we’d run the opposite way. When I reached
6
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the virtual safety of the building, another round launched across the Tigris
River. Within seconds it screeched down almost atop us. I jumped into the
building headlong through a jagged hole that used to hold a door. Iraqis
had long since looted the windows, doors, and frames in the days following
the invasion. The round exploded within a few meters of us.
I looked up from the smoky rubble, and there were two senior noncommissioned officers sitting calmly in the dark, smoking cigarettes. Early on
in the attack as they evacuated their trailer and ran for cover, they had
seen me and other staff officers, mouths agape as the mortar rounds rained
down in the camp next door. They had watched us almost buy the farm. I
wondered instantly why we had more rank. It seemed to me the Army had
commissioned the wrong people.
“Hi, sir,” he said, smirking. “What the fuck were you guys doing out there,
sir?” he asked sarcastically, the cigarette dangling from his toothy grin.
“Sightseeing,” I answered as I finally took a breath. I realized just how
stupid my actions had been. I was disoriented from the fatigue, still asleep
when John dragged me outside, and I guess I made myself vulnerable
because I needed to see what had pulled me away from my family and
brought me six thousand miles to Iraq. To this day I can’t definitively say
why I stood there and watched the mortar rounds come in, but I can say
with no hesitation that I was never again a spectator.
We huddled closely into the small space of the shattered building, and I
thought about how good their cigarettes smelled and wondered when the
attack would end and how many more attacks I would have to endure. I had
been in Iraq a few weeks, and while I had heard car bombs, mortar rounds
and rockets exploding, and small-arms fire in previous weeks echoing in
the distance, this was the first time the war had gotten close to me.
At the time I was working in Saddam Hussein’s Republican Palace, an
immensely disgusting display of wealth and opulence within the Green Zone,
so I felt doubly safe and disconnected from harm inside of our marbled
military headquarters. Because of this insulation I was still not yet used to
the incoming fire, but in the coming months I would grow accustomed to
it and eventually become numb to its sound as it angrily fell to the earth in
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search of a target. It would become a part of daily life sometimes for weeks
at a time, and we treated it like inclement weather. We would don our flak
vests and helmets and go about our business as calmly as one opens an
umbrella or puts on a coat. It was part of the elements in Baghdad. The
attacks were more inconvenient than they were dangerous. Maybe that’s what
I convinced myself of as I walked passed coalition soldiers cannonballing
into Hussein’s pool as other soldiers who couldn’t resist the palace chow
hall’s three hot meals per day bronzed their bellies on lounge chairs. It was
almost as if there were an invisible bubble over Saddam’s pool. Nobody
there ever felt like they’d get killed, or maybe they just didn’t give a shit.
The mortars that night stopped firing shortly after a U.S. Army Apache
helicopter flew overhead and headed off toward the Baghdad skyline. A
soldier, moments later, walked up with a smoldering piece of rocket he
had found a few feet from us, and we all looked at it as if it were an ancient
relic. We were fascinated by it and pushed and shoved each other like kids
trying to see something at show-and-tell. I didn’t feel like a professional
soldier. I felt like an amateur, a moron, someone just making believe he was
a soldier. We had heard the mortar rounds coming in, but in between the
mortar volleys the enemy had also fired rockets at us that made no sound
as they came to the earth until they exploded.
“Steve, you’re bleeding,” someone said, and flashlights began to click on and
get passed around as people checked themselves and each other for wounds.
I borrowed a flashlight to illuminate my leg, and there were a few small
trails of blood flowing down my knee to my shin. My leg was a little meaty,
but it was nothing more than a few lesions. I’ve seen worse injuries on my
kids’ knees after they fall off their scooters and color our driveway with
their blood and skin. I didn’t need a medic, just a change of underwear, a
children’s chewable aspirin, and a stiff glass of bourbon.
I pressed my leg to see if I could feel anything underneath my skin, but
the only thing I felt was my knobby knee. My leg was a little numb, and I
had no sensation on my skin. The leg worked fine, but at that moment I
decided I would take up smoking again while in Iraq, and the next day I
bought a carton of Marlboros reds and became a closet smoker.
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More than thirty minutes later we walked back to the trailer and collected some things. We simply couldn’t sleep at the trailer that night. It was
too risky. I cleaned up my knee with a first-aid kit and put some bandages
on the wounds. As we walked to the palace, nearly forty-five minutes after
the attack stopped, the loudspeaker in the distance echoed, “All clear! All
clear!” into the warm night air. No shit, I thought.
John found a comfortable picnic table al fresco on one of the palace’s patios
and made himself at home for the night, and I slept inside the makeshift
multidenominational U.S. chapel on an ornate couch for a couple of hours
as people quietly entered the chapel throughout the night. One soldier
entered and went to the front of the chapel to a table that was considered
the pulpit, and he kneeled before it, bowed his head, and prayed. He had
enough ammunition on him to sack a city, and by the look on his face when
he turned around I could tell that wherever he was going, the ammunition
wasn’t enough to make him feel safe.
The next day as I and fellow fobbits talked about what happened that
night, some of my fellow staff officers opined that I was likely hit by shrapnel
from the rocket or by some other object that was sent flying by the exploding
shell. An airborne infantry major who worked at our command watched
me run for cover from the blown-out building where he had gone when
the shelling began. As I ran toward him he said I ran right through the
impact area and that he saw blood on me as I arrived at the building. He
was convinced I had been hit. I don’t remember details like where I was or
where I ran, and if asked today to retrace those steps I could probably just
offer the direction I ran. I do remember the loud explosions, percussions of
the rounds, and a lot of dust. The T-shirt I had on during the attack had a
giant dusty skid mark on the front of it from the collar to my belly. Another
possibility is that I got my pulpy knee from hitting the rocky floor of the
building when I dove into it. The only thing I know for sure is that I had
some minor cuts, and for that I was thankful.
My knee had bubbled up about as big as a grapefruit, so I iced it,
wrapped it, and ate plenty of painkillers. One of my teeth overnight had
also started hurting, and I couldn’t chew on one side of my mouth. The
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major and another officer I worked next to insisted I should get examined
by medical personnel. They were smart. It was better to be safe than sorry.
I reluctantly went to the combat support hospital (known as a c ash ) to get
examined. As I waited to be seen by the doctors, helicopters landed at the
hospital’s landing zone. Staffers hurriedly wheeled in soldiers on stretchers
and whisked them into curtained rooms, where medical teams converged
with machinery and tools in tow to try to salvage and fix broken soldiers.
The hallways were filled with walking wounded, some with visible injuries
and others who might be there to get treated for food poisoning, the flu,
or some other ailment. The c ash was like any other hospital. It had sick
and wounded of all varieties in it. I watched a soldier get wheeled in while
several medical personnel walked quickly alongside his stretcher, talking
fitfully at each other and reaching across the fallen warrior urgently, like
hungry kids at a dinner table. Across from me a sergeant sat in a bloodsoaked shirt with his buddy. A couple of seats down from me a soldier
complained about having difficulty breathing, while others just sat there
and stared at the wall across from them, avoiding eye contact.
An enlisted medic ran out from the curtained room and sprinted down
the hall and out of view. Seconds later he returned with several others running with him, and they all disappeared behind the bustling curtained area.
“Fuck this,” I whispered to myself. I walked out of the waiting area, down
the long straight hallway, and out into the hot, scorching Baghdad sun. I
had no business being there. I had all my limbs and organs. I felt like a big
pussy sitting in that waiting area, especially as wounded warriors were being
brought in on stretchers. I couldn’t get out of there fast enough, and I felt
an overwhelming sense of shame come over me.
Getting explosives lobbed at you was a part of life in the Green Zone,
and living in a trailer so close to the Red Zone (we were about twenty yards
from the edge of the Green Zone) had its downside for sure, but when I
first arrived in Iraq I was placed in a transient tent as I awaited permanent
quarters that was much worse. It was filled with about fifty musty men and
air-conditioned, and it had plywood floors and electricity. Lights went out
promptly at 10:00 p.m., but most of us were kept awake by the explosions
10
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echoing in the Baghdad night or by the guys who watched black-market
porn on their laptops.
Some of the guys, despite a ban on food in the tents, sloppily ate at their
cots, and a couple of times I felt rats crawling on me in the middle of the
night as they searched for food. These were some pretty ballsy rodents, and
somebody got smart and attracted one of the many feral cats around the
palace and turned him loose in the tent during daylight hours. The rats all
but disappeared, but the gunfire and explosions didn’t.
One night as I struggled to fall asleep, a guy burst into our tent yelling,
“We’re being attacked! They’re coming at us from everywhere!” I was in
my boxers and a T-shirt, and I jumped up; put on my boots, flak vest, and
helmet; and loaded a magazine into my Beretta pistol. I ran outside into
the darkness and ran for a corner of the property to a spot I had scouted
out when I arrived in Baghdad. I was a new guy and had not yet realized
that the Green Zone was probably safer than most U.S. cities, save for the
mortar rounds and rockets.
I crouched behind a tree stump and looked around. My tent was the
only one of three transient tents emptying gun-toting, flashlight-wielding
morons into the hot, arid night. Men in their underwear ran around with
no direction, while many of the civilians ran into the nearby palace, despite
having weapons and ammunition they could use to defend themselves.
Outside the night was alive with gunfire my music headset had muffled
as I lay on my cot. In the sky tracer rounds gracefully danced against the
smooth black canvas of the night. They were bright as they shot out from
behind the shadowy skyline and burned out softly as they disappeared in
the skies above Baghdad. In my underwear and boots, armed with a little
pistol, I was ready to make my last stand. John Wayne had nothing on me.
A U.S. naval officer crept up alongside of me.
“You see that shit, sir?” I asked him. Baghdad looked like 1991 all over
again when coalition forces bombed the city in what we in the military
call Gulf War Part I. This time it was small-arms fire and not antiaircraft
artillery illuminating the night.
“What the fuck are they doing?” he said softly.
Insulation
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What could they be shooting at in the sky? I thought to myself.
As we crouched defensively a guy walked out of the nearby showers. The
open door of the shower trailer momentarily illuminated the dark grounds
around us and cast a light on us and our position. He walked by us wrapped
in a towel from the waist down, carrying his toiletry kit in one hand and a
flashlight in the other, his toothbrush sticking out of his mouth.
“That’s celebratory gunfire,” he said as he walked by spitting, pointing to
the light show in the distance with his flashlight. “Iraq’s soccer team beat
Saudi Arabia,” he said, and he disappeared into a nearby tent.
The naval officer began to shout angrily. “Who said we were getting
attacked?”
The darkness offered no answer, just the distant sound of rifle reports.
Most from our tent had already realized it was a false alarm or a really good
gag and had already gone back inside.
“It’s going to be a long six months if this keeps happening,” the officer said.
“Yes, sir,” I said. “But I’ve got to be here a year, so it’s going to be an
extra-long time for me.”
“You poor bastard,” he said, chuckling. “You must be in the Army,” he
said, smiling underneath a thick mustache. I nodded. “Shit, you should
have joined the Navy,” he joked.
Ain’t that the fucking truth? I thought.
In the distance around the corner of the palace, the loudspeaker blared,
“Take cover! Take cover!” as we went back inside our tent, and everyone
on the grounds ignored the orders. Later as I lay in my cot thinking about
the night’s comedic events, I could only think about my family and going
home. Then in the darkness I heard the loudspeakers announce, “All clear!
All clear!” and in the distance the celebration continued and the rifle reports
were my lullaby.

12

Insulation
Buy the Book

